../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3

Bug Summary

File:	out/../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
Warning:	line 115, column 23 Dereference of null pointer
Annotated Source Code

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clang -cc1 -cc1 -triple x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -analyze -disable-free -clear-ast-before-backend -disable-llvm-verifier -discard-value-names -main-file-name ssl3_record.c -analyzer-checker=core -analyzer-checker=apiModeling -analyzer-checker=unix -analyzer-checker=deadcode -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.UncheckedReturn -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.getpw -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.gets -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.mktemp -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.mkstemp -analyzer-checker=security.insecureAPI.vfork -analyzer-checker=nullability.NullPassedToNonnull -analyzer-checker=nullability.NullReturnedFromNonnull -analyzer-output plist -w -setup-static-analyzer -mrelocation-model pic -pic-level 2 -pic-is-pie -mframe-pointer=all -fmath-errno -ffp-contract=on -fno-rounding-math -mconstructor-aliases -funwind-tables=2 -target-cpu x86-64 -tune-cpu generic -debugger-tuning=gdb -fcoverage-compilation-dir=/home/maurizio/node-v18.6.0/out -resource-dir /usr/local/lib/clang/16.0.0 -D V8_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS -D V8_IMMINENT_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS -D _GLIBCXX_USE_CXX11_ABI=1 -D NODE_OPENSSL_CONF_NAME=nodejs_conf -D NODE_OPENSSL_HAS_QUIC -D __STDC_FORMAT_MACROS -D OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED -D OPENSSL_THREADS -D OPENSSL_NO_HW -D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100001L -D STATIC_LEGACY -D NDEBUG -D OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE -D L_ENDIAN -D OPENSSL_BUILDING_OPENSSL -D AES_ASM -D BSAES_ASM -D CMLL_ASM -D ECP_NISTZ256_ASM -D GHASH_ASM -D KECCAK1600_ASM -D MD5_ASM -D OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -D OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -D OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -D OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ -D OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -D PADLOCK_ASM -D POLY1305_ASM -D SHA1_ASM -D SHA256_ASM -D SHA512_ASM -D VPAES_ASM -D WHIRLPOOL_ASM -D X25519_ASM -D OPENSSL_PIC -D MODULESDIR="/home/maurizio/node-v18.6.0/out/Release/obj.target/deps/openssl/lib/openssl-modules" -D OPENSSLDIR="/home/maurizio/node-v18.6.0/out/Release/obj.target/deps/openssl" -D OPENSSLDIR="/etc/ssl" -D ENGINESDIR="/dev/null" -D TERMIOS -I ../deps/openssl/openssl -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/include -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/crypto -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/include -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/modes -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/curve448 -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/curve448/arch_32 -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/providers/common/include -I ../deps/openssl/openssl/providers/implementations/include -I ../deps/openssl/config -I ../deps/openssl/config/archs/linux-x86_64/asm -I ../deps/openssl/config/archs/linux-x86_64/asm/include -I ../deps/openssl/config/archs/linux-x86_64/asm/crypto -I ../deps/openssl/config/archs/linux-x86_64/asm/crypto/include/internal -I ../deps/openssl/config/archs/linux-x86_64/asm/providers/common/include -internal-isystem /usr/local/lib/clang/16.0.0/include -internal-isystem /usr/local/include -internal-isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/8/../../../../x86_64-redhat-linux/include -internal-externc-isystem /include -internal-externc-isystem /usr/include -O3 -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-old-style-declaration -fdebug-compilation-dir=/home/maurizio/node-v18.6.0/out -ferror-limit 19 -fgnuc-version=4.2.1 -vectorize-loops -vectorize-slp -analyzer-output=html -faddrsig -D__GCC_HAVE_DWARF2_CFI_ASM=1 -o /tmp/scan-build-2022-08-22-142216-507842-1 -x c ../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
1/*
* Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/

10#include "../ssl_local.h"
11#include <openssl/trace.h>
12#include <openssl/rand.h>
13#include <openssl/core_names.h>
14#include "record_local.h"
15#include "internal/cryptlib.h"

17static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
  0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
  0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
  0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
  0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
  0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
  0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
24};

26static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
  0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
  0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
  0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
  0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
  0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
  0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
33};

35/*
* Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
*/
38void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
39{
  unsigned char *comp;
  size_t i;

  for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
      comp = r[i].comp;

      memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
      r[i].comp = comp;
  }
49}

51void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
52{
  size_t i;

  for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
      OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp)CRYPTO_free(r[i].comp, "../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 56);
      r[i].comp = NULL((void*)0);
  }
59}

61void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
62{
  memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE8);
64}

66/*
* Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
* for us in the buffer.
*/
70static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
71{
  SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
  size_t left, len;
  unsigned char *p;

  rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)(&(&s->rlayer)->rbuf);

  p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf)((rbuf)->buf);
  if (p == NULL((void*)0))
      return 0;

  left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf)((rbuf)->left);

  if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH5)
      return 0;

  p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf)((rbuf)->offset);

  /*
   * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version
   * etc later
   */
  if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA23)
      return 0;

  p += 3;
  n2s(p, len)((len=(((unsigned int)((p)[0]))<< 8)| (((unsigned int)(
(p)[1])) )),(p)+=2);

  if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH5 + len)
      return 0;

  return 1;
103}

105int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send)
106{
  uint32_t max_early_data;
  SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
40
←
'sess' initialized to a null pointer value→

  /*
   * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
   * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
   * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
   */
  if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
41
←
Assuming field 'server' is 0→
42
←
Dereference of null pointer
      if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL((s->psksession != ((void*)0) && s->psksession->
ext.max_early_data > 0) != 0)
                       && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)((s->psksession != ((void*)0) && s->psksession->
ext.max_early_data > 0) != 0)) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 118, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
          return 0;
      }
      sess = s->psksession;
  }

  if (!s->server)
      max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
  else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED2)
      max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
  else
      max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
                       ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;

  if (max_early_data == 0) {
      SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 134, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (send ? 80 : 10), (
164), ((void*)0))
               SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 134, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (send ? 80 : 10), (
164), ((void*)0));
      return 0;
  }

  /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
  max_early_data += overhead;

  if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
      SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 143, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (send ? 80 : 10), (
164), ((void*)0))
               SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 143, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (send ? 80 : 10), (
164), ((void*)0));
      return 0;
  }
  s->early_data_count += length;

  return 1;
149}

151/*
* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
* will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
* attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
* cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
*/
157#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS32 32

159#define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH2   2
160/*-
* Call this to get new input records.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
* When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i':
* rr[i].type    - is the type of record
* rr[i].data,   - data
* rr[i].length, - number of bytes
* Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all
* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <=
* |max_pipelines|
*/
172/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
173int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
174{
  int enc_err, rret;
  int i;
  size_t more, n;
  SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
  SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
  SSL_SESSION *sess;
  unsigned char *p;
  unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE64];
  unsigned int version;
  size_t mac_size = 0;
  int imac_size;
  size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
  PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
  int is_ktls_left;
  SSL_MAC_BUF *macbufs = NULL((void*)0);
  int ret = -1;

  rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->rrec);
  rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)(&(&s->rlayer)->rbuf);
  is_ktls_left = (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf)((rbuf)->left) > 0);
1
Assuming field 'left' is <= 0→
  max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
  if (max_recs == 0)
2
←
Assuming 'max_recs' is not equal to 0→
3
←
Taking false branch→
      max_recs = 1;
  sess = s->session;

  do {
      thisrr = &rr[num_recs];

      /* check if we have the header */
      if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->rstate) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY0xF1) ||
4
←
Assuming field 'rstate' is equal to SSL_ST_READ_BODY→
          (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length)
5
←
Assuming field 'packet_length' is >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH→
           < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH5)) {
          size_t sslv2len;
          unsigned int type;

          rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH5,
                             SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)((rbuf)->len), 0,
                             num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n);
          if (rret <= 0) {
214#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
              if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)(0) || rret == 0)
                  return rret;     /* error or non-blocking */
              switch (errno(*__errno_location ())) {
              case EBADMSG74:
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 220, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0))
                           SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 220, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0));
                  break;
              case EMSGSIZE90:
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 224, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (198), ((void
*)0))
                           SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 224, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (198), ((void
*)0));
                  break;
              case EINVAL22:
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 228, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (70), (267), ((void
*)0))
                           SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 228, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (70), (267), ((void
*)0));
                  break;
              default:
                  break;
              }
233#endif
              return rret;
          }
          RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY)((&s->rlayer)->rstate = (0xF1));

          p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet);
          if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet),
                               RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length))) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 241, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
              return -1;
          }
          sslv2pkt = pkt;
          if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len)
                  || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 247, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (50), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
              return -1;
          }
          /*
           * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
           */
          if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->is_first_record)
                  && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0
                  && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO1)) {
              /*
               *  SSLv2 style record
               *
               * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
               * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
               * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
               * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
               * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
               */
              thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE22;
              thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION0x0002;

              thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;

              if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)((rbuf)->len)
                  - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH2) {
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 273, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (198), ((void
*)0))
                           SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 273, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (198), ((void
*)0));
                  return -1;
              }

              if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN9) {
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 278, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (50), (160), ((void
*)0));
                  return -1;
              }
          } else {
              /* SSLv3+ style record */

              /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
              if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
                      || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
                      || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
                  if (s->msg_callback)
                      s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER0x100, p, 5, s,
                                      s->msg_callback_arg);
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 291, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (50), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
                  return -1;
              }
              thisrr->type = type;
              thisrr->rec_version = version;

              if (s->msg_callback)
                  s->msg_callback(0, version, SSL3_RT_HEADER0x100, p, 5, s,
                                  s->msg_callback_arg);

              /*
               * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field
               * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the
               * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3
               * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for
               * that explicitly
               */
              if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)(!(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) &&
 (s)->method->version >= 0x0304 && (s)->method
->version != 0x10000)
                      && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING
                      && version != (unsigned int)s->version) {
                  if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
                      && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
                      if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT21) {
                          /*
                           * The record is using an incorrect version number,
                           * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
                           * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a
                           * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably
                           * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
                           * end.
                           */
                          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 323, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (-1), (267), ((void
*)0))
                                   SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 323, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (-1), (267), ((void
*)0));
                          return -1;
                      }
                      /*
                       * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
                       */
                      s->version = (unsigned short)version;
                  }
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 332, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (70), (267), ((void
*)0))
                           SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 332, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (70), (267), ((void
*)0));
                  return -1;
              }

              if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR0x03) {
                  if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->is_first_record)) {
                      /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
                       * that we have. */
                      p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet);
                      if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
                          strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
                          strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
                          strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
                          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 345, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (-1), (156), ((void
*)0));
                          return -1;
                      } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
                          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 349, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (-1), (155), ((void
*)0))
                                   SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 349, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (-1), (155), ((void
*)0));
                          return -1;
                      }

                      /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
                      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 355, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (-1), (267), ((void
*)0))
                               SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 355, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (-1), (267), ((void
*)0));
                      return -1;
                  } else {
                      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 359, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (70), (267), ((void
*)0))
                               SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 359, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (70), (267), ((void
*)0));
                      return -1;
                  }
              }

              if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)(!(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) &&
 (s)->method->version >= 0x0304 && (s)->method
->version != 0x10000) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL((void*)0)) {
                  if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA23
                          && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC20
                              || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)((s)->s3.tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || (s)->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len
 == 0))
                          && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT21
                              || s->statem.enc_read_state
                                 != ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS)) {
                      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 372, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (443), ((void
*)0))
                               SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 372, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (443), ((void
*)0));
                      return -1;
                  }
                  if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION0x0303) {
                      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 377, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (50), (267), ((void
*)0))
                               SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 377, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (50), (267), ((void
*)0));
                      return -1;
                  }
              }

              if (thisrr->length >
                  SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)((rbuf)->len) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH5) {
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 385, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (198), ((void
*)0))
                           SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 385, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (198), ((void
*)0));
                  return -1;
              }
          }

          /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
      }

      if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)(!(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) &&
 (s)->method->version >= 0x0304 && (s)->method
->version != 0x10000)) {
6
←
Taking false branch→
7
←
Assuming the condition is false→
          if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH(16384 + 256)) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 396, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (150), ((void
*)0))
                       SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 396, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (150), ((void
*)0));
              return -1;
          }
      } else {
          size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH((256 + 64)+16384);

402#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
          /*
           * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
           * does not include the compression overhead anyway.
           */
          if (s->expand == NULL((void*)0))
              len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD1024;
409#endif

          /* KTLS may use all of the buffer */
          if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)(0) && !is_ktls_left)
              len = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf)((rbuf)->left);

          if (thisrr->length > len) {
8
←
Assuming 'len' is >= field 'length'→
9
←
Taking false branch→
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 417, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (150), ((void
*)0))
                       SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 417, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (150), ((void
*)0));
              return -1;
          }
      }

      /*
       * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
       * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
       * record
       */
      if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION0x0002) {
10
←
Assuming field 'rec_version' is not equal to SSL2_VERSION→
11
←
Taking false branch→
          more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH2
              - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH5;
      } else {
          more = thisrr->length;
      }

      if (more > 0) {
12
←
Assuming 'more' is <= 0→
13
←
Taking false branch→
          /* now s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */

          rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n);
          if (rret <= 0)
              return rret;     /* error or non-blocking io */
      }

      /* set state for later operations */
      RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER)((&s->rlayer)->rstate = (0xF0));

      /*
       * At this point, s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
       * + thisrr->length, or s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
       * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->rlayer.packet
       */
      if (thisrr->rec_version13.1
Field 'rec_version' is not equal to SSL2_VERSION
 == SSL2_VERSION0x0002) {
14
←
Taking false branch→
          thisrr->input =
              &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH2]);
      } else {
          thisrr->input =
              &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH5]);
      }

      /*
       * ok, we can now read from 's->rlayer.packet' data into 'thisrr'.
       * thisrr->input points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied
       * into thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression.
       * When the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer,
       * thisrr->input will be updated to point at the new buffer
       */

      /*
       * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
       * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
       */

      /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */
      thisrr->data = thisrr->input;
      thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length;

      /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
      thisrr->read = 0;

      num_recs++;

      /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
      RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
      RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->is_first_record = 0);
  } while (num_recs < max_recs
15
←
Assuming 'num_recs' is >= 'max_recs'→
           && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA23
           && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x1)
           && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL((void*)0)
           && (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
               & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE0X800000) != 0
           && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));

  if (num_recs15.1
'num_recs' is equal to 1
 == 1
          && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC20
16
←
Assuming field 'type' is not equal to SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC→
          && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)(!(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) &&
 (s)->method->version >= 0x0304 && (s)->method
->version != 0x10000) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
          && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)((s)->s3.tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || (s)->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len
 == 0)) {
      /*
       * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01
       */
      if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 500, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (47), (260), ((void
*)0))
                   SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 500, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (47), (260), ((void
*)0));
          return -1;
      }
      /*
       * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty
       * handshake record
       */
      thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE22;
      RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->empty_record_count++);
      if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->empty_record_count)
          > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS32) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 512, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (262), ((void
*)0))
                   SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 512, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (262), ((void
*)0));
          return -1;
      }
      thisrr->read = 1;
      RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1)((&s->rlayer)->numrpipes = (1));

      return 1;
  }

  /*
   * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
   * then it is from before enabling ktls
   */
  if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)(0) && !is_ktls_left)
      goto skip_decryption;

  if (s->read_hash != NULL((void*)0)) {
17
←
Assuming field 'read_hash' is equal to NULL→
      const EVP_MD *tmpmd = EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash);

      if (tmpmd != NULL((void*)0)) {
          imac_size = EVP_MD_get_size(tmpmd);
          if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)((imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= 64) != 0)) {
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 534, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((6 | (0x2 <<
 18L))), ((void*)0));
                  return -1;
          }
          mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
      }
  }

  /*
   * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
   * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
   */
  if (SSL_READ_ETM(s)(s->s3.flags & 0x0100) && s->read_hash) {
18
←
Taking false branch→
19
←
Assuming the condition is false→
      unsigned char *mac;

      for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
          thisrr = &rr[j];

          if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 552, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (50), (160), ((void
*)0));
              return -1;
          }
          thisrr->length -= mac_size;
          mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
          i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
          if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 560, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0))
                       SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 560, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0));
              return -1;
          }
      }
      /*
       * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted
       * record
       */
      mac_size = 0;
  }

  if (mac_size19.1
'mac_size' is <= 0
 > 0) {
20
←
Taking false branch→
      macbufs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*macbufs) * num_recs)CRYPTO_zalloc(sizeof(*macbufs) * num_recs, "../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 572);
      if (macbufs == NULL((void*)0)) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 574, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((256|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
          return -1;
      }
  }

  enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0, macbufs, mac_size);
21
←
Value assigned to field 'session'→

  /*-
   * enc_err is:
   *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
   *       decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed.
   *    1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
   */
  if (enc_err == 0) {
22
←
Assuming 'enc_err' is not equal to 0→
23
←
Taking false branch→
      if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
          /* SSLfatal() already got called */
          goto end;
      }
      if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
          /*
           * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt will fail here. We treat
           * it like an empty record.
           */

          thisrr = &rr[0];

          if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length,
                                   EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD((6 * (16 + 1)) + 2), 0)) {
              /* SSLfatal() already called */
              goto end;
          }

          thisrr->length = 0;
          thisrr->read = 1;
          RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1)((&s->rlayer)->numrpipes = (1));
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
          ret = 1;
          goto end;
      }
      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 614, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0))
               SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 614, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0));
      goto end;
  }
  OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)do { BIO *trc_out = ((void*)0); if (0) {
24
←
Taking false branch→
      BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length);
      BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr[0].data, rr[0].length, 4);
  } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS)} while(0);

  /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
  if ((sess != NULL((void*)0))
25
←
Assuming 'sess' is equal to NULL→
          && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL((void*)0))
          && (!SSL_READ_ETM(s)(s->s3.flags & 0x0100) && EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash) != NULL((void*)0))) {
      /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */

      for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
          SSL_MAC_BUF *thismb = &macbufs[j];
          thisrr = &rr[j];

          i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
          if (i == 0 || thismb == NULL((void*)0) || thismb->mac == NULL((void*)0)
              || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, thismb->mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
              enc_err = 0;
          if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH16384 + mac_size)
              enc_err = 0;
      }
  }

  if (enc_err25.1
'enc_err' is not equal to 0
 == 0) {
26
←
Taking false branch→
      if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
          /* We already called SSLfatal() */
          goto end;
      }
      /*
       * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
       * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
       * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
       * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
       * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
       */
      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 654, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0))
               SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 654, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0));
      goto end;
  }

skip_decryption:

  for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
27
←
Loop condition is true.  Entering loop body→
35
←
Loop condition is false. Execution continues on line 765→
      thisrr = &rr[j];

      /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
      if (s->expand != NULL((void*)0)) {
28
←
Assuming field 'expand' is equal to NULL→
          if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH16384) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 667, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (140), ((void
*)0))
                       SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 667, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (140), ((void
*)0));
              goto end;
          }
          if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 672, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (30), (107), ((void
*)0))
                       SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 672, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (30), (107), ((void
*)0));
              goto end;
          }
      }

      if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)(!(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) &&
 (s)->method->version >= 0x0304 && (s)->method
->version != 0x10000)
29
←
Taking false branch→
30
←
Assuming the condition is false→
              && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL((void*)0)
              && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT21) {
          size_t end;

          if (thisrr->length == 0
                  || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA23) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 684, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (443), ((void
*)0));
              goto end;
          }

          /* Strip trailing padding */
          for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
               end--)
              continue;

          thisrr->length = end;
          thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
          if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA23
                  && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT21
                  && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE22) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 698, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (443), ((void
*)0));
              goto end;
          }
          if (s->msg_callback)
              s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE0x101,
                              &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
      }

      /*
       * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in
       * length.
       */
      if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)(!(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) &&
 (s)->method->version >= 0x0304 && (s)->method
->version != 0x10000)
              && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE22
                  || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT21)
              && thisrr->length == 0) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 714, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (271), ((void
*)0));
          goto end;
      }

      /*
       * Usually thisrr->length is the length of a single record, but when
       * KTLS handles the decryption, thisrr->length may be larger than
       * SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH because the kernel may have coalesced
       * multiple records.
       * Therefore we have to rely on KTLS to check the plaintext length
       * limit in the kernel.
       */
      if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH16384
31
←
Assuming field 'length' is <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH→
              && (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)(0) || is_ktls_left)) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 728, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (146), ((void
*)0));
          goto end;
      }

      /*
       * Check if the received packet overflows the current
       * Max Fragment Length setting.
       * Note: USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT and KTLS are mutually exclusive.
       */
      if (s->session != NULL((void*)0) && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)(((s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) >= 1) &&
 ((s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) <= 4))
32
←
Assuming field 'session' is equal to NULL→
              && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)(512U << (s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode -
 1))) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 739, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (146), ((void
*)0));
          goto end;
      }

      thisrr->off = 0;
      /*-
       * So at this point the following is true
       * thisrr->type   is the type of record
       * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record
       * thisrr->off    == offset to first valid byte
       * thisrr->data   == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
       */

      /* just read a 0 length packet */
      if (thisrr->length == 0) {
33
←
Assuming field 'length' is not equal to 0→
34
←
Taking false branch→
          RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->empty_record_count++);
          if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->empty_record_count)
              > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS32) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 757, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (10), (298), ((void
*)0));
              goto end;
          }
      } else {
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->empty_record_count = 0);
      }
  }

  if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) {
36
←
Assuming field 'early_data_state' is equal to SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING→
37
←
Taking true branch→
      thisrr = &rr[0];
      if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA23
38
←
Assuming field 'type' is equal to SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA→
              && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) {
39
←
Calling 'early_data_count_ok'→
          /* SSLfatal already called */
          goto end;
      }
  }

  RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs)((&s->rlayer)->numrpipes = (num_recs));
  ret = 1;
end:
  if (macbufs != NULL((void*)0)) {
      for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
          if (macbufs[j].alloced)
              OPENSSL_free(macbufs[j].mac)CRYPTO_free(macbufs[j].mac, "../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 780);
      }
      OPENSSL_free(macbufs)CRYPTO_free(macbufs, "../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 782);
  }
  return ret;
785}

787int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
788{
789#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  int i;

  if (rr->comp == NULL((void*)0)) {
      rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
          OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)CRYPTO_malloc(((256 + 64)+16384), "../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 794);
  }
  if (rr->comp == NULL((void*)0))
      return 0;

  i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
                        SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH16384, rr->data, (int)rr->length);
  if (i < 0)
      return 0;
  else
      rr->length = i;
  rr->data = rr->comp;
806#endif
  return 1;
808}

810int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
811{
812#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  int i;

  i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
                          (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD1024),
                          wr->input, (int)wr->length);
  if (i < 0)
      return 0;
  else
      wr->length = i;

  wr->input = wr->data;
824#endif
  return 1;
826}

828/*-
* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls SSLfatal on
* internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
* report a bad_record_mac
*
* Returns:
*    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
*    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
*/
837int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
           SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize)
839{
  SSL3_RECORD *rec;
  EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
  size_t l, i;
  size_t bs;
  const EVP_CIPHER *enc;

  rec = inrecs;
  /*
   * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
   */
  if (n_recs != 1)
      return 0;
  if (sending) {
      ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
      if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL((void*)0))
          enc = NULL((void*)0);
      else
          enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
  } else {
      ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
      if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL((void*)0))
          enc = NULL((void*)0);
      else
          enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
  }

  if ((s->session == NULL((void*)0)) || (ds == NULL((void*)0)) || (enc == NULL((void*)0))) {
      memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
      rec->input = rec->data;
  } else {
      int provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL((void*)0));

      l = rec->length;
      bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);

      /* COMPRESS */

      if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
          /*
           * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
           * padding on the provider side.
           */
          i = bs - (l % bs);

          /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
          l += i;
          /*
           * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
           * padding length.
           */
          memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
          rec->length += i;
          rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
      }

      if (!sending) {
          if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
              /* Publicly invalid */
              return 0;
          }
          /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
      }

      if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL((void*)0)) {
          int outlen;

          if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
                                (unsigned int)l))
              return 0;
          rec->length = outlen;

          if (!sending && mac != NULL((void*)0)) {
              /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
              OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;

              /* Get the MAC */
              mac->alloced = 0;

              *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC"tls-mac",
                                                    (void **)&mac->mac,
                                                    macsize);
              *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();

              if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
                  /* Shouldn't normally happen */
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 925, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
                  return 0;
              }
          }
      } else {
          if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
              /* Shouldn't happen */
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 932, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
              return 0;
          }

          if (!sending)
              return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
                                         rec->orig_len,
                                         rec->data,
                                         (mac != NULL((void*)0)) ? &mac->mac : NULL((void*)0),
                                         (mac != NULL((void*)0)) ? &mac->alloced : NULL((void*)0),
                                         bs,
                                         macsize,
                                         s->ctx->libctx);
      }
  }
  return 1;
948}

950#define MAX_PADDING256 256
951/*-
* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
* error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to report
* a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
*
* Returns:
*    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
*       decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
*    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
*/
961int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
           SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize)
963{
  EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
  size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES32];
  unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES32][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN13];
  int i, pad = 0, tmpr;
  size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
  unsigned char padval;
  const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
  int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE8)
                            : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE4);

  if (n_recs == 0) {
      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 975, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
      return 0;
  }

  if (sending) {
      if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
          int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash)EVP_MD_get_size(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash));
          if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)((n >= 0) != 0)) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 983, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
              return 0;
          }
      }
      ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
      if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL((void*)0))
          enc = NULL((void*)0);
      else {
          int ivlen;

          enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
          /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
          if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x1)
              && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE0x2)
              ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
          else
              ivlen = 0;
          if (ivlen > 1) {
              for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
                  if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
                      /*
                       * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
                       * happen?? (steve)
                       */
                      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1007, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
                      return 0;
                  } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
                                           ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
                      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1011, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
                      return 0;
                  }
              }
          }
      }
  } else {
      if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash)) {
          int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->read_hash)EVP_MD_get_size(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash));
          if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)((n >= 0) != 0)) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1021, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
              return 0;
          }
      }
      ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
      if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL((void*)0))
          enc = NULL((void*)0);
      else
          enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
  }

  if ((s->session == NULL((void*)0)) || (ds == NULL((void*)0)) || (enc == NULL((void*)0))) {
      for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
          memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
          recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
      }
  } else {
      int provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL((void*)0));

      bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));

      if (n_recs > 1) {
          if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
                & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE0X800000) == 0) {
              /*
               * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
               * cipher doesn't support pipelining
               */
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1049, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), (406), ((void
*)0));
              return 0;
          }
      }
      for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
          reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;

          if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
                      & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER0x200000) != 0) {
              unsigned char *seq;

              seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->write_sequence)
                  : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->read_sequence);

              if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8)) {
                  /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
                  unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;

                  s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :(((p)[0]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&s->rlayer)->
d->w_epoch) : ((&s->rlayer)->d->r_epoch))>>
 8)&0xff), (p)[1]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&s->
rlayer)->d->w_epoch) : ((&s->rlayer)->d->r_epoch
)) )&0xff)),(p)+=2)
                      DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p)(((p)[0]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&s->rlayer)->
d->w_epoch) : ((&s->rlayer)->d->r_epoch))>>
 8)&0xff), (p)[1]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&s->
rlayer)->d->w_epoch) : ((&s->rlayer)->d->r_epoch
)) )&0xff)),(p)+=2);
                  memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
                  memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
              } else {
                  memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
                  for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
                      ++seq[i];
                      if (seq[i] != 0)
                          break;
                  }
              }

              buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
              buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
              buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
              buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
              buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
              pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD0x16,
                                        EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN13, buf[ctr]);
              if (pad <= 0) {
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1088, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
                  return 0;
              }

              if (sending) {
                  reclen[ctr] += pad;
                  recs[ctr].length += pad;
              }

          } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
              /*
               * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
               * padding on the provider side.
               */
              padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);

              /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */

              if (padnum > MAX_PADDING256) {
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1107, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
                  return 0;
              }
              /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
              padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
              for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
                  recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
              reclen[ctr] += padnum;
              recs[ctr].length += padnum;
          }

          if (!sending) {
              if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
                  /* Publicly invalid */
                  return 0;
              }
          }
      }
      if (n_recs > 1) {
          unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES32];

          /* Set the output buffers */
          for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
              data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
          }
          if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS0x22,
                                  (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1134, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), (406), ((void
*)0));
              return 0;
          }
          /* Set the input buffers */
          for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
              data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
          }
          if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS0x23,
                                  (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
              || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS0x24,
                                     (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1145, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), (406), ((void
*)0));
              return 0;
          }
      }

      if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) && tlstree_enc) {
          unsigned char *seq;
          int decrement_seq = 0;

          /*
           * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
           * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
           * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
           */
          if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s)(s->s3.flags & 0x0400))
              decrement_seq = 1;

          seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->write_sequence)
                        : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->read_sequence);
          if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE0x2A, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1165, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
              return 0;
          }
      }

      if (provided) {
          int outlen;

          /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
          if (n_recs > 1)  {
              SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1175, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
              return 0;
          }

          if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
                                (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
              return 0;
          recs[0].length = outlen;

          /*
           * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
           * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
           * any explicit IV
           */
          if (!sending) {
              if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE0x6) {
                      recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                      recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
              } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE0x7) {
                      recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                      recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
              } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x1)) {
                  recs[0].data += bs;
                  recs[0].input += bs;
                  recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
              }

              /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
              if (macs != NULL((void*)0)) {
                  OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;

                  /* Get the MAC */
                  macs[0].alloced = 0;

                  *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC"tls-mac",
                                                        (void **)&macs[0].mac,
                                                        macsize);
                  *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();

                  if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
                      /* Shouldn't normally happen */
                      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1217, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0))
                               ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1217, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((259|((0x1 <<
 18L)|(0x2 << 18L)))), ((void*)0));
                      return 0;
                  }
              }
          }
      } else {
          /* Legacy cipher */

          tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
                            (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
          if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
               & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER0x100000) != 0
              ? (tmpr < 0)
              : (tmpr == 0)) {
              /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
              return 0;
          }

          if (!sending) {
              for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
                  /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
                  if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE0x6) {
                      recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                      recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                      recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                  } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE0x7) {
                      recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                      recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                      recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN8;
                  } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x1)) {
                      if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
                          return 0;
                      recs[ctr].data += bs;
                      recs[ctr].input += bs;
                      recs[ctr].length -= bs;
                      recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
                  }

                  /*
                   * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
                   * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
                   */
                  if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
                                       recs[ctr].orig_len,
                                       recs[ctr].data,
                                       (macs != NULL((void*)0)) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL((void*)0),
                                       (macs != NULL((void*)0)) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
                                                      : NULL((void*)0),
                                       bs,
                                       pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
                                       (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
                                       & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER0x200000) != 0,
                                       s->ctx->libctx))
                      return 0;
              }
          }
      }
  }
  return 1;
1276}

1278/*
* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
* which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
*/
1282char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
1283{
  switch (EVP_MD_CTX_get_type(ctx)EVP_MD_get_type(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(ctx))) {
  case NID_md54:
  case NID_sha164:
  case NID_sha224675:
  case NID_sha256672:
  case NID_sha384673:
  case NID_sha512674:
      return 1;
  default:
      return 0;
  }
1295}

1297int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1298{
  unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
  const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
  unsigned char *p, rec_char;
  size_t md_size;
  size_t npad;
  int t;

  if (sending) {
      mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
      seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer)((&ssl->rlayer)->write_sequence);
      hash = ssl->write_hash;
  } else {
      mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
      seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer)((&ssl->rlayer)->read_sequence);
      hash = ssl->read_hash;
  }

  t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash)EVP_MD_get_size(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash));
  if (t < 0)
      return 0;
  md_size = t;
  npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;

  if (!sending
      && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx)EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ssl->enc_read_ctx
)) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE0x2
      && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
1325#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
      return 0;
1327#else
      /*
       * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
       * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
       * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
       */

      /*-
       * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
       *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
       *
       * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
       * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
       * total size.
       */
      unsigned char header[75];
      size_t j = 0;
      memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
      j += md_size;
      memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
      j += npad;
      memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
      j += 8;
      header[j++] = rec->type;
      header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
      header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);

      /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
      if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
                                 md, &md_size,
                                 header, rec->input,
                                 rec->length, rec->orig_len,
                                 mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
          return 0;
1361#endif
  } else {
      unsigned int md_size_u;
      /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
      EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();

      if (md_ctx == NULL((void*)0))
          return 0;

      rec_char = rec->type;
      p = md;
      s2n(rec->length, p)(((p)[0]=(unsigned char)(((rec->length)>> 8)&0xff
), (p)[1]=(unsigned char)(((rec->length) )&0xff)),(p)+=
2);
      if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL((void*)0)) <= 0
          || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
          || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
          EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
          return 0;
      }

      EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
  }

  ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
  return 1;
1395}

1397int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1398{
  unsigned char *seq;
  EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
  size_t md_size;
  int i;
  EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL((void*)0), *mac_ctx;
  unsigned char header[13];
  int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM2)
                           : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM1);
  int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE8)
                            : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE4);
  int t;
  int ret = 0;

  if (sending) {
      seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer)((&ssl->rlayer)->write_sequence);
      hash = ssl->write_hash;
  } else {
      seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer)((&ssl->rlayer)->read_sequence);
      hash = ssl->read_hash;
  }

  t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash)EVP_MD_get_size(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash));
  if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)((t >= 0) != 0))
      return 0;
  md_size = t;

  /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
  if (stream_mac) {
      mac_ctx = hash;
  } else {
      hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
      if (hmac == NULL((void*)0) || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
          goto end;
      }
      mac_ctx = hmac;
  }

  if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)(ssl->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8) && tlstree_mac && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE0x4, 0, seq) <= 0) {
      goto end;
  }

  if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)(ssl->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8)) {
      unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;

      s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :(((p)[0]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&ssl->rlayer)->
d->w_epoch) : ((&ssl->rlayer)->d->r_epoch))>>
 8)&0xff), (p)[1]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&ssl->
rlayer)->d->w_epoch) : ((&ssl->rlayer)->d->
r_epoch)) )&0xff)),(p)+=2)
          DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p)(((p)[0]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&ssl->rlayer)->
d->w_epoch) : ((&ssl->rlayer)->d->r_epoch))>>
 8)&0xff), (p)[1]=(unsigned char)(((sending ? ((&ssl->
rlayer)->d->w_epoch) : ((&ssl->rlayer)->d->
r_epoch)) )&0xff)),(p)+=2);
      memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);

      memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
  } else
      memcpy(header, seq, 8);

  header[8] = rec->type;
  header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
  header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
  header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
  header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);

  if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl)(ssl->s3.flags & 0x0100)
      && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx)EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ssl->enc_read_ctx
)) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE0x2
      && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
      OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;

      *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE"tls-data-size",
                                         &rec->orig_len);
      *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();

      if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
                                   tls_hmac_params)) {
          goto end;
      }
  }

  if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
      || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
      || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
      goto end;
  }

  OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)do { BIO *trc_out = ((void*)0); if (0) {
      BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
      BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
      BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
      BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
  } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS)} while(0);

  if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)(ssl->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & 0x8)) {
      for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
          ++seq[i];
          if (seq[i] != 0)
              break;
      }
  }
  OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)do { BIO *trc_out = ((void*)0); if (0) {
      BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
      BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
  } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS)} while(0);
  ret = 1;
end:
  EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
  return ret;
1500}

1502int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1503{
  int i;
  int enc_err;
  SSL_SESSION *sess;
  SSL3_RECORD *rr;
  int imac_size;
  size_t mac_size = 0;
  unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE64];
  size_t max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH16384;
  SSL_MAC_BUF macbuf = { NULL((void*)0), 0 };
  int ret = 0;

  rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->rrec);
  sess = s->session;

  /*
   * At this point, s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
   * and we have that many bytes in s->rlayer.packet
   */
  rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13]);

  /*
   * ok, we can now read from 's->rlayer.packet' data into 'rr'. rr->input
   * points at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by
   * either the decryption or by the decompression. When the data is 'copied'
   * into the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
   */

  /*
   * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
   * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
   */

  /* check is not needed I believe */
  if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH((256 + 64)+16384)) {
      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1538, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (150), ((void
*)0));
      return 0;
  }

  /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
  rr->data = rr->input;
  rr->orig_len = rr->length;

  if (s->read_hash != NULL((void*)0)) {
      const EVP_MD *tmpmd = EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash);

      if (tmpmd != NULL((void*)0)) {
          imac_size = EVP_MD_get_size(tmpmd);
          if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)((imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= 64) != 0)) {
                  SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1552, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (80), ((6 | (0x2 <<
 18L))), ((void*)0));
                  return 0;
          }
          mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
      }
  }

  if (SSL_READ_ETM(s)(s->s3.flags & 0x0100) && s->read_hash) {
      unsigned char *mac;

      if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1563, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (50), (160), ((void
*)0));
          return 0;
      }
      rr->length -= mac_size;
      mac = rr->data + rr->length;
      i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
      if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1571, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0))
                   SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1571, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (20), (281), ((void
*)0));
          return 0;
      }
      /*
       * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted
       * record
       */
      mac_size = 0;
  }

  /*
   * Set a mark around the packet decryption attempt.  This is DTLS, so
   * bad packets are just ignored, and we don't want to leave stray
   * errors in the queue from processing bogus junk that we ignored.
   */
  ERR_set_mark();
  enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0, &macbuf, mac_size);

  /*-
   * enc_err is:
   *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
   *       decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed.
   *    1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
   */
  if (enc_err == 0) {
      ERR_pop_to_mark();
      if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
          /* SSLfatal() got called */
          goto end;
      }
      /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
      rr->length = 0;
      RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
      goto end;
  }
  ERR_clear_last_mark();
  OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)do { BIO *trc_out = ((void*)0); if (0) {
      BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %zd\n", rr->length);
      BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr->data, rr->length, 4);
  } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS)} while(0);

  /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
  if ((sess != NULL((void*)0))
          && !SSL_READ_ETM(s)(s->s3.flags & 0x0100)
          && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL((void*)0))
          && (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash) != NULL((void*)0))) {
      /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */

      i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
      if (i == 0 || macbuf.mac == NULL((void*)0)
          || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, macbuf.mac, mac_size) != 0)
          enc_err = 0;
      if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH16384 + mac_size)
          enc_err = 0;
  }

  if (enc_err == 0) {
      /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
      rr->length = 0;
      RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
      goto end;
  }

  /* r->length is now just compressed */
  if (s->expand != NULL((void*)0)) {
      if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH16384) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1638, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (140), ((void
*)0))
                   SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1638, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (140), ((void
*)0));
          goto end;
      }
      if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
          SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1642, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (30), (107), ((void
*)0));
          goto end;
      }
  }

  /* use current Max Fragment Length setting if applicable */
  if (s->session != NULL((void*)0) && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)(((s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) >= 1) &&
 ((s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) <= 4)))
      max_plain_length = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)(512U << (s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode -
 1));

  /* send overflow if the plaintext is too long now it has passed MAC */
  if (rr->length > max_plain_length) {
      SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)(ERR_new(), ERR_set_debug("../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1653, __func__), ossl_statem_fatal)((s), (22), (146), ((void
*)0));
      goto end;
  }

  rr->off = 0;
  /*-
   * So at this point the following is true
   * ssl->s3.rrec.type   is the type of record
   * ssl->s3.rrec.length == number of bytes in record
   * ssl->s3.rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
   * ssl->s3.rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
   *                        after use :-).
   */

  /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
  RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);

  /* Mark receipt of record. */
  dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);

  ret = 1;
end:
  if (macbuf.alloced)
      OPENSSL_free(macbuf.mac)CRYPTO_free(macbuf.mac, "../deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c"
, 1676);
  return ret;
1678}

1680/*
* Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
*/
1683#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s)dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), &(((&s->rlayer
)->d->processed_rcds))) \
                 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
                 &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->d->processed_rcds)))

1687/*-
* Call this to get a new input record.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
* ssl->s3.rrec.type    - is the type of record
* ssl->s3.rrec.data    - data
* ssl->s3.rrec.length  - number of bytes
*/
1696/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
1697int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
1698{
  int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
  int rret;
  size_t more, n;
  SSL3_RECORD *rr;
  unsigned char *p = NULL((void*)0);
  unsigned short version;
  DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
  unsigned int is_next_epoch;

  rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->rrec);

again:
  /*
   * The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the pending records.
   * This is a non-blocking operation.
   */
  if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) {
      /* SSLfatal() already called */
      return -1;
  }

  /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
  if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), &(((&s->rlayer
)->d->processed_rcds))))
      return 1;

  /* get something from the wire */

  /* check if we have the header */
  if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->rstate) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY0xF1) ||
      (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13)) {
      rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13,
                         SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf)((&s->rlayer.rbuf)->len), 0, 1, &n);
      /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
      if (rret <= 0) {
          /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
          return rret;         /* error or non-blocking */
      }

      /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
      if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length) !=
          DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13) {
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
          goto again;
      }

      RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY)((&s->rlayer)->rstate = (0xF1));

      p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet);

      if (s->msg_callback)
          s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER0x100, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13,
                          s, s->msg_callback_arg);

      /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
      rr->type = *(p++);
      ssl_major = *(p++);
      ssl_minor = *(p++);
      version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;

      /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
      n2s(p, rr->epoch)((rr->epoch=(((unsigned int)((p)[0]))<< 8)| (((unsigned
 int)((p)[1])) )),(p)+=2);

      memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->read_sequence)[2]), p, 6);
      p += 6;

      n2s(p, rr->length)((rr->length=(((unsigned int)((p)[0]))<< 8)| (((unsigned
 int)((p)[1])) )),(p)+=2);
      rr->read = 0;

      /*
       * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
       * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
       */
      if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT21) {
          if (version != s->version) {
              /* unexpected version, silently discard */
              rr->length = 0;
              rr->read = 1;
              RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
              goto again;
          }
      }

      if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
          /* wrong version, silently discard record */
          rr->length = 0;
          rr->read = 1;
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
          goto again;
      }

      if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH((256 + 64)+16384)) {
          /* record too long, silently discard it */
          rr->length = 0;
          rr->read = 1;
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
          goto again;
      }

      /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */
      if (s->session != NULL((void*)0) && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)(((s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) >= 1) &&
 ((s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) <= 4))
              && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)(512U << (s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode -
 1)) + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD(256 + 64)) {
          /* record too long, silently discard it */
          rr->length = 0;
          rr->read = 1;
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
          goto again;
      }

      /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
  }

  /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */

  if (rr->length >
      RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13) {
      /* now s->rlayer.packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
      more = rr->length;
      rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n);
      /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
      if (rret <= 0 || n != more) {
          if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
              /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */
              return -1;
          }
          rr->length = 0;
          rr->read = 1;
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
          goto again;
      }

      /*
       * now n == rr->length, and s->rlayer.packet_length ==
       * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
       */
  }
  /* set state for later operations */
  RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER)((&s->rlayer)->rstate = (0xF0));

  /* match epochs.  NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
  bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
  if (bitmap == NULL((void*)0)) {
      rr->length = 0;
      RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0); /* dump this record */
      goto again;             /* get another record */
  }
1844#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
  /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
  if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1847#endif
      /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
      if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
          rr->length = 0;
          rr->read = 1;
          RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0); /* dump this record */
          goto again;         /* get another record */
      }
1855#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
  }
1857#endif

  /* just read a 0 length packet */
  if (rr->length == 0) {
      rr->read = 1;
      goto again;
  }

  /*
   * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
   * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
   * processed at this time.
   */
  if (is_next_epoch) {
      if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
          if (dtls1_buffer_record (s,
                  &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->d->unprocessed_rcds)),
                  rr->seq_num) < 0) {
              /* SSLfatal() already called */
              return -1;
          }
      }
      rr->length = 0;
      rr->read = 1;
      RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0);
      goto again;
  }

  if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
      if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
          /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */
          return -1;
      }
      rr->length = 0;
      rr->read = 1;
      RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->packet_length = 0); /* dump this record */
      goto again;             /* get another record */
  }

  return 1;

1898}

1900int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off)
1901{
  SSL3_RECORD *rr;

  rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer)((&s->rlayer)->rrec);
  memset(rr, 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));

  rr->length = len;
  rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE22;
  memcpy(rr->seq_num, seq, sizeof(rr->seq_num));
  rr->off = off;

  s->rlayer.packet = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)(&(&s->rlayer)->rbuf)->buf;
  s->rlayer.packet_length = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13 + len;
  rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH13;

  if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
                          SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)((s->rlayer.rrec)->seq_num)) <= 0) {
      /* SSLfatal() already called */
      return 0;
  }

  return 1;
1923}